2 maternal terms: Timaeus, in Plato's dialogue, famously likens it with a 'mother' [meter] and a 'wet-nurse', drawing on female connotations distinct from the paternal demiurge and creator present from the outset of his story. 6 For Kristeva, the maternal body is 'the ordering principle of the semiotic chora' (RPL, p. 27).
One could object that such an account problematically seems to divide a pre-symbolic, drive-ridden, natural, passive, maternal mold or receptacle from a symbolic-logic, cultural, active, paternal force of creation, with the consequence that we, again, essentialise such categories along gendered lines. This is precisely what many feminist thinkers have done.
They have taken issue with the very association of the semiotic chora with the maternal body since they view it as ascribing to woman the role of mother and, moreover, as inscribing this position in an essential realm beyond culture and signification. Tina Chanter explains that, ' [t]o the extent that Kristeva seeks to focus upon the maternal experience as a dimension whose significance patriarchal society has tended to overlook, and to the extent that the semiotic is associated with maternity, it is inferred that in embracing the semiotic, Kristeva endorses essentialism'. 7 Jacqueline Rose describes 'that essentialism and primacy of the semiotic' as 'one of the most problematic aspects' of Kristeva's work. 8 Gerardine Meaney speaks of a 'quasi-mystical realm' that 'looks suspiciously like the eternal feminine'. 9 Jennifer Stone dismisses the semiotic chora as a regression to a-historical perceptions of femininity. 10 And Gayatri Spivak admits to being 'repelled by Kristeva's politics', accusing her of a 'long-standing implicit sort of positivism: naturalising of the chora, naturalising of the pre-semiotic'. 11 It is these charges of essentialism that I would like to address here, in an attempt to show that the semiotic chora (and its associations with maternity) by no means can be described in pre-cultural or essential terms, but rather as always already integral to the symbolic order or symbolisation. 12 More specifically, I will turn to Judith Butler's critique of Kristeva in her essay 'The Body Politic of Kristeva' -published in Gender Trouble (1990) -in order to shed light on these issues.
I will argue that Kristeva by no means reduces woman to the function of motherhood but that, rather, she returns to the maternal body in part to free women from this very reduction. By bringing the mother out of the shadows she provides women with a past (a genealogy of their own, a community of women, a history hitherto repressed) and,
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Studies in the Maternal, 2 (1) 2010, www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk 3 simultaneously, with a future (in the sense of liberating them from pre-defined roles and positions -from motherhood as the only form of subjectivity available to them). It is exactly the future that is at stake when Kristeva speaks of the maternal, and more specifically it is the possibility of temporal change that depends on it. The maternal body to which she urges us to return must, as I see it, be understood qua temporalisation: that to which we return is temporal, moving, displacing, renewing. The return is neither nostalgic nor aimed at preserving some essential notion of motherhood; it makes possible new beginnings, allowing for a future pregnant with change and transformation.
Butler ends her critique of Kristeva with the following remark -one that is meant to describe what would happen if we stopped focusing on the mother the way Kristeva has done hitherto: 'The culturally constructed body will then be liberated, neither to its "natural" past, nor to its original pleasures, but to an open future of cultural possibilities' (GT, p. 119). I will attempt to show that these words in fact capture Kristeva's own project, that such 'open future' is exactly what she is aiming at through her continuous return to the maternal.
I
In 'Stabat Mater' -arguably her most important essay on maternity -Kristeva addresses the feminist view that she has reduced woman to the function of motherhood while simultaneously excluding the mother from the symbolic pact altogether. She also clarifies what her own attempt to revisit the maternal amounts to: [W] e are caught in a paradox. First, we live in a civilization where the consecrated (religious or secular) representation of femininity is absorbed by motherhood. If, however, one looks at it more closely, this motherhood is the fantasy that is nurtured by the adult, man or woman, of a lost territory, what is more, it involves less an idealized archaic mother than the idealization of the relationship that binds us to her, one that cannot be localized -an idealization of primary narcissism. Now, when feminism demands a new representation of femininity, it seems to identify motherhood with that idealized misconception and, because it rejects the image and its misuse, feminism circumvents the real experience that fantasy overshadows. The result? -a negation or rejection of motherhood by some avant-garde feminist groups. Or else an acceptance -conscious or not -of its traditional representations by the great mass of people, women and men. (SM, p. 236). The male subject would, as it were, try to tame maternal power through an act of appropriation -one maybe most clearly exemplified by a Socratic philosophy of midwifery. 14 […] forgotten time crops up suddenly and condenses into a flash of lightning an operation that, if it were thought out, would involve bringing together the two opposite terms but, on account of that flash, is discharged like thunder. The time of abjection is double: a time of oblivion and thunder, of veiled infinity and the moment when revelation bursts forth. 17 The two types of time thus recur -monumental infinity and cyclical rhythm -both illustrated by the flash. This passage, moreover, brings forth another important aspect of maternal temporality; it is capable of avoiding the teleological movement of (Hegelian) synthesis ('bringing together the two opposite terms') and, instead, sustains difference and heterogeneity within the double time of abjection. Returning to 'Stabat Mater', we find the articulation of this thought in the only other capitalised passage, this time consisting of two nouns -WORD FLESH -kept together or separated by no other term, no middle third that would allow them to merge. WORD FLESH; the paradigmatic opposites of a (paternal) cultural domain. Maternal time -integral to the very experience of motherhood -is one that respects and sustains difference and heterogeneity, challenging the linearity of (Hegelian) synthesis. 18 Kristeva describes the maternal as an 'ambivalent principle' (SM, pp. 234-5) or a 'seesaw' (SM, p. 258), and notes that Christianity -'the most refined symbolic construct in which femininity […] is focused on Maternality' (SM, p. 234) -has attempted 'to freeze that seesaw', to 'stop it, tear women away from its rhythm, settle them permanently in the spirit' (SM, p. 259). She sees the very figure of Mary as an example of how motherhood has been cemented in a frozen image -pure (untouched) and infinite (immortal) -freed from the heterogeneity of human embodiment and the oscillating rhythms of maternal temporality, the latter capable of sustaining difference and female singularity. Patrilinearity is installed through a word detached from flesh, and woman is left with no other identities accessible to her than Maternity in its idealised form. 19 The maternal to which we return is thus not, in my Kristeva; and second, she worries that Kristeva's alleged attempts to delimit 'maternity as an essentially precultural reality' will lead to a reification of motherhood that precludes 'an analysis of its cultural construction and variability' (GT, p. 103). Butler argues that by positing an 'outside' of culture, Kristeva fails to see that it may well be the effect or product of the very law or order from which it is said to be excluded. Put differently, 'repression may be understood to produce the object that it comes to deny' (GT, p. 119).
While I think Butler's worries are important ones -she in fact articulates some of the most central and difficult challenges for feminist thought today -she misses the target due to some fundamental misconceptions of Kristeva's thought that run through her argument. The most important one is the bundling together of Kristeva and Lacan as thinkers who speak of an unspeakable outside that is prior to and opposed to culture and the symbolic order.
Kristeva's whole project is, in my mind, precisely a sustained attempt to avoid such oppositional and exclusive structures, which is why she consistently describes the semiotic and the symbolic as co-dependant, co-existing, intertwined. 20 Kristeva herself explains that the alleged exclusivity between the two realms is 'relative, precisely because of the necessary dialectic between the two modalities of the signifying process, which is constitutive of the subject. Because the subject is always both semiotic and symbolic, no signifying system he produces can be either "exclusively" semiotic or "exclusively" symbolic, and is instead necessarily marked by an indebtedness to both' (RPL, p. 24).
When Butler speaks of the semiotic as 'distinct' from, or in 'opposition' to the symbolic (GT, pp. 104, 114) -descriptions that will come to inform the central claims of her own argument -she thus misconstrues a central aspect of Kristeva's work, namely that which marks her as different from Lacan. The semiotic, Kristeva insists, is a condition for and a product of the symbolic:
Although originally a precondition of the symbolic, the semiotic functions within signifying practices as the result of a transgression of the symbolic. Therefore the semiotic that 'precedes' symbolization is only a theoretical supposition justified by the need for description. It exists in Subversion, for Kristeva, means transformation, not complete breakdown or erasure. And the aim of poetic language, as I read her, is not merely to destroy the symbolic order, but rather to allow it to survive -a term which I suggest that we must understand quite literally as the sustainability and injection of life and aliveness into discourse, as opposed to a kind of mechanical and dead discourse that would reproduce itself eternally and exclude alterity and alteration altogether. 21 In fact, Kristeva warns us of the potential danger inherent in the transgressive element of artistic creation, and calls for a 'structurally necessary protection, one that serves to check negativity, confine it within the stases, and prevent it from sweeping away the symbolic position' (RPL, pp. 69-70).
I moreover take it that Kristeva's acknowledgment of the impossibility of a 'full-scale refusal of the Symbolic' has to do exactly with the fact that the semiotic, for her, in fact does not lie outside or beyond the symbolic in the sense Butler would like us to think it does. It is exactly because it is always already part of and produced by the symbolic order that the semiotic is bound to in some sense 'fail'; that it cannot fully undermine it. And similarly, it is because of this interdependence that the symbolic, in turn, can never fully rid itself of the semiotic; why semiotic drives and rhythms are bound to re-surface and re-emerge in language no matter how much we try to repress and silence them.
If we take seriously Kristeva's attempt to think of the semiotic and symbolic as standing together we will begin to see not only the emancipatory potential of her work, but also how it cannot be said to assume a self-identical or essential 'outside' that governs yet somehow escapes language. Kristeva does not, as Butler suggests, call for a fully finalised 'liberation […] from the shackles of paternal law' -such liberation would, as Butler herself has carefully pointed out, be the equivalent of psychosis for Kristeva (GT, p. 119). 22 There is no possibility of '[n]egating or denying the symbolic' for Kristeva, since without it the speaking subject 'would be incapable of doing anything' (RPL, p. 63). This, of course, is completely in line with Butler's own Foucauldian analysis of the power of discourse. As she herself states in the opening pages of Gender Trouble: 'Obviously the political task is not to refuse representational politics -as if we could. The juridical structures of language and politics constitute the contemporary field of power; hence, there is no position outside this field, but only a critical genealogy of its own legitimating practices' (GT, p. 8). What Kristeva does call for, however, is a more integrated and balanced relationship between the two modalities of language: maternal and paternal, semiotic and symbolic. The interdependence between the two is, for her, a fact. The question remains whether we are willing and able to acknowledge and embrace this interdependence and give voice to both, or whether one (paternal-symbolic) is allowed to thrive at the expense of the other (maternal-semiotic).
A helpful way of problematising the relationship between semiotic and symbolic, and one that I think clarifies my critique of Butler, appears in Tina Chanter's essay 'Kristeva's Politics of Change'. Chanter interestingly suggests that the two realms can be compared to the distinction between sex and gender, a division that has been scrutinised and questioned by
Butler herself in books such as Bodies That Matter (1993). If traditionally feminists have
viewed sex as static and 'natural' while gender has been understood as 'cultural' and subject to change, Butler is among those who have begun to question this distinction, pointing instead to the fact that sex, too, in some sense is constructed and, therefore, subject to change.
Chanter asserts that 'it is no longer so clear where sex stops and culture starts, since our very definition of sex is always already bound up in cultural assumptions -just as semiotic We must, however, address two points raised by Butler: Why choose the figure of motherhood to speak of repressed aspects of discourse; and is it the case that this maternal figure can be assumed to be repressed -or is it not rather a 'compulsory cultural construction', one that assumes 'the female body as a maternal body' (GT, p. 115)? At this point we must return to 'Stabat Mater' and the way in which I proposed that we read this essay as an account of maternity articulated in terms of temporality.
III
Butler asks: 'What grounds, then, does Kristeva have for imputing a maternal teleology to the female body prior to its emergence into culture' (GT, p. 115)? Kristeva does indeed make what looks like a distinction between the archaic mother of the semiotic chora, on the one hand, and the idealised and fantasmatic mother that emerges out of the symbolic order as mere image or icon, on the other. While both depend on the symbolic order, it does seem like the former is somehow more 'authentic' or 'originary' than the latter. As we saw, Kristeva did not want to reject motherhood altogether (like Butler?) but she also did not want to accept its traditional representation (like the great mass of people). It seems as if she wants to say that the maternal body is both repressed and compulsory, depending on what we mean when we speak of it.
Let me begin by addressing the latter of these two; the 'traditional representation' of motherhood -I think Kristeva would argue in agreement with Butler -is compulsory in ways that delimit women and ascribe to them a pre-defined set of expectations upon which their subjectivity depends. This narrow (yet universalised) notion of maternity is thus something that Kristeva is as critical of as Butler. As I see it, however, it is not the case, as Butler suggests, that Kristeva assumes 'a true body beyond the law' (GT, p. 119). In fact Kristeva, in line with Butler, describes embodiment as a process of signification. The human body, she asserts, cannot 'function biologically and physiologically, unless it is included within a practice that encompasses the signifying process. Without such a practice, the body in process/on trial is disarticulated; its drives tear it up into stymied, motionless sectors and it constitutes a weighty mass. Outside the process, its only identity is inorganic, paralyzed, dead' (RPL, p. 101). The alleged 'true body beyond the law' would be nothing but a piece of dead meat. Matter, to use a Butlerian expression, in this case would not matter. 23 But at the same time it should be clear by now that the maternal body, for Kristeva, is also in fact repressed. Insofar as we speak of maternity as a certain kind of corporeal-temporal experience -manifested in the rhythms and oscillations that emerge through the semiotic modality of language -it is, on Kristeva's account, to a large extent made invisible to the point of erasure in our culture. It is when speaking of this kind of maternity that we must ask (with Butler) why we should hold on to the image of the mother, instead of just speaking of a different kind of language or temporal experience, if that is what ultimately is at stake.
The point, as I see it, is not that all women are or should be mothers, but rather that all human beings (at least as of yet) have and are born from mothers. Our refusal to acknowledge our dual origins is exactly what installs the patrilinear conception of time that has come to dominate Western discourse. At stake, then, is our own acknowledgement of being born, of having been generated, of springing forth from a dual origin, maternal and paternal. 24 Through the figure of the mother, we are able to rethink the relationship between temporality and corporeality -not, as one might think, through a reductive equation of the maternal with corporeality and the paternal with time -but exactly thanks to the way in which the maternal body qua generative brings our attention to the continuity between time and matter. That time is embodied and that bodies are temporal. This, in my view, is what Kristeva is seeking to express in her work, which is why she returns to the notion of chora and then further elaborates her concerns with language, embodiment, and time, using the maternal body as her point of departure. As she herself suggests in one of her early essays: 'Rhythm, a sequence of linked instants, is immanent to the chora prior to any signified spaciousness: henceforth, chora and rhythm, space and time, coexist'. Kristeva: 'What has not been sufficiently appreciated is the extent to which the semiotic is a realm that only acquires meaning -or indeed existence -within the realm of the symbolic. The semiotic/symbolic distinction is not offered as a mutually exclusive one. Semiotic meaning can only emerge retroactively, and can only be expressed within the terms of the symbolic (KPC, p. 184). It is interesting to note that Chanter, who is one of few interlocutors to take seriously this interdependence between the two realms and the implications thereof, does so with a reference to Kristeva's understanding of time: 'The way in which Kristeva thematizes the problem of time suggests the need not only to continually rethink and revise feminist strategies, but also to reconceptualize the idea of history to which we unthinkingly appeal when we dub a certain thinker ahistorical' (KPC, p. 183). The judgment of Kristeva as an essentialist thinker may well be the result of a failure to see the role that time plays in her thought. 21 Kristeva asserts that, 'only the subject, for whom the thetic is not a repression of the semiotic chora but instead a position either taken on or undergone, can call into question the thetic so that a new disposition may be articulated' (RPL, p. 51). What is at stake here is renewal, not absolute destruction. Later in Revolution in Poetic Language she reminds us that while the thetic is 'absolutely necessary', it is nevertheless 'not exclusive: the here is the duality of our beginnings. In its attempts to establish a stable and single origin, the Western metaphysical tradition repeatedly erases the maternal function in favour of a paternal principle (God the Father, the Platonic idea, the Cartesian Cogito, and so on). Kristeva herself very often speaks of a maternal function (one that can be inhabited by women and men alike), and more than anything she stresses the need to establish dual origins so as to avoid repetition of the same. The point-as I am trying to establish in this essay-is to acknowledge the interdependence between semiotic and symbolic, maternal and paternal, instead of granting privilege to one over the other. That said, it is nevertheless clear that the recent transformation of the institution of motherhood (from reproductive technologies to gay parents to transsexual fathers) forces us to rethink the very function of motherhood in ways that have yet to be explored. 
